Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the possible computation runs of the system; and strategies define the behaviour of agents. Typically, strategies are modelled as functions from sequences of system states to player actions. Analysing a system in such a setting involves computing the set of (Nash) equilibria in the concurrent game. However, we show that, with respect to the above model of strategies (arguably, the "standard" model in the computer science literature), bisimilarity does not preserve the existence of Nash equilibria. Thus, two concurrent games which are behaviourally equivalent from a semantic perspective, and which from a logical perspective satisfy the same temporal logic formulae, may nevertheless have fundamentally different properties (solutions) from a game theoretic perspective. Our aim in this paper is to explore the issues raised by this discovery. After illustrating the issue by way of a motivating example, we present three models of strategies with respect to which the existence of Nash equilibria is preserved under bisimilarity. We use some of these models of strategies to provide new semantic foundations for logics for strategic reasoning, and investigate restricted scenarios where bisimilarity can be shown to preserve the existence of Nash equilibria with respect to the conventional model of strategies in the computer science literature.
Introduction
The concept of bisimilarity plays a central role in both the theory of concurrency [Mil89, HM85] and logic [van76, HM85] . In the context of concurrency, bisimilar systems are regarded as behaviourally equivalent-appearing to have the same behaviour when interacting with an arbitrary environment. From a logical/verification perspective, bisimilar systems are known to satisfy the same temporal logic properties with respect to languages such as LTL, CTL, or the µ-calculus [Pnu77, CE81, Koz83] . These features, in turn, make it possible to verify temporal logic properties of concurrent systems using bisimulation-based approaches [SR12] . For example, temporal logic model checking techniques [CGP02] may be optimised by applying them to the smallest bisimulation equivalent model of the system being analysed; or, indeed, to any other model within the system's bisimulation equivalence class. This is possible because the properties that one is interested in checking are bisimulation invariant.
Model checking [CGP02] is not the only verification technique that can benefit from bisimulation invariance: consider abstraction and refinement techniques [CGL94, CC02] (where a set of states is either collapsed or broken down in order to build a somewhat simpler set of states); coinduction methods [San09] (which can be used to check the correctness of an implementation with respect to a given specification); or reduced BDD representations of a system [Bry92] (where isomorphic, and therefore bisimilar, subgraphs are merged, thereby eliminating part of the initial state space of the system). Bisimulation invariance is therefore a powerful and fundamental concept in the formal analysis and verification of concurrent and multi-agent systems, which plays an important role in many verification tools.
Game theory provides another important framework for the analysis and verification of concurrent and multi-agent systems. Within this framework, a concurrent/multi-agent system is viewed as a game, where processes/agents correspond to players, system executions (that is, computation runs) to plays, and individual process behaviours are modelled as player strategies, which are used to resolve the possible nondeterministic choices available to each player. A widely-used model for strategies in concurrent games is to view a strategy for a process/agent/player i as a function f i which maps finite histories s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s k of system states to actions f i (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s k ) available to i at state s k . (In what follows, we use the terms process, agent, and player interchangeably.) We refer to this as the "conventional" model of strategies, as it is the best-known and most widely-used model in logic, AI, and computer science (and indeed in extensive form games [OR94] ). For instance, specification languages such as Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL [AHK02] ), and formal models such as concurrent game structures [AHK02] use this model of strategies. If we model a concurrent/multi-agent system as a game in this way, then the analysis and verification of the system reduces to computing the set of (Nash) equilibria in the associated game; in some cases, the analysis reduces to the computation of a winning strategy in the game, that is, a strategy that ensures that the players who follow such a plan will achieve their goal no matter how the other players in the system play, i.e., against any other possible counter-strategy. Now, because bisimilar systems are regarded as behaviourally equivalent, and bisimilar systems satisfy the same set of temporal logic properties, it is natural to ask whether the Nash equilibria of bisimilar structures can be identified in a similar way; that is, we ask the following question:
Is Nash equilibrium invariant under bisimilarity? We show that, for the "conventional" model of strategies, the answer to this question is, in general, no. More specifically, the answer critically depends on precisely how players' strategies are modelled. With the conventional model of strategies, we find the answer is positive only for some two-player games, but negative in general for games with more than two players. This means, for instance, that, in the general case, bisimulation-based techniques cannot be used when one is also reasoning about the Nash equilibria of concurrent systems that are formally modelled as multi-player (concurrent) games.
For instance, given a concurrent and reactive system, represented as a collection of individual system components, say P 1 , . . . , P n , one may want to know if a given temporal logic property, say ϕ, is satisfied by these system components whenever they choose to use strategies that form an equilibrium, that is, we want to know whether for some/every computation run ρ ∈ NE (P 1 , . . . , P n ) we have ρ |= ϕ, where NE (P 1 , . . . , P n ) denotes the set of all computation runs that may be generated as a result of P 1 , . . . , P n selecting strategies that form a Nash equilibrium. Because we are interested in concurrent systems, and bisimilarity is one of the most important behavioural equivalences in concurrency [Mil80, HM85, DV95, vGW96] , it is highly desirable that properties which hold in equilibrium are sustained across all systems that are bisimilar to P 1 , . . . , P n , meaning that for every (temporal logic) property ϕ and every process P i , if P i is bisimilar to P i ∈ {P 1 , . . . , P n }, then ϕ is satisfied in equilibrium by P 1 , . . . P i . . . P n if and only if is also satisfied in equilibrium by P 1 , . . . P i . . . , P n , the system in which P i is replaced by P i , that is, across all bisimilar systems to P 1 , . . . , P n . This property, called invariance under bisimilarity, has been widely used for decades for the semantic analysis (e.g., for modular and compositional reasoning) and formal verification (e.g., for temporal logic model checking) of concurrent systems. Unfortunately, as shown here, and already discussed in [GHW15a] , the satisfaction of temporal logic properties in equilibrium is not invariant under bisimilarity, thus posing a verification challenge for the modular and compositional reasoning of concurrent systems, since individual system components in a concurrent system cannot be replaced by (behaviourally equivalent) bisimilar ones, while preserving the temporal logic properties that the overall system satisfies in equilibrium. This is also a problem from a synthesis point of view. Indeed, a strategy for a system component P i may not be a valid strategy for a bisimilar system component P i . As a consequence, the problem of building strategies for individual processes in the concurrent system P 1 , . . . P i . . . P n may not, in general, be the same as building strategies for a bisimilar system P 1 , . . . P i . . . P n , again, dashing any hope of modular reasoning on concurrent systems.
Motivated by these observations-which bring together in a striking way a fundamental concept in game theory and a fundamental concept in logic/concurrency-the purpose of the present paper is to investigate these issues in detail. We first present a motivating example, to illustrate the basic point that using the conventional model of strategies, bisimulation need not preserve Nash equilibria. We then present three alternative models of strategies in which Nash equilibria and their existence are preserved under bisimilarity. We also study the above question for different classes of systems, for instance deterministic and nondeterministic ones, and explore applications to logic. Specifically, we investigate the implications of replacing the conventional model of strategies with some of the models we propose in this paper in logics for strategic reasoning [MMPV14, CHP10] , in particular, the semantic implications with respect to Strategy Logic (SL [MMPV14] ). We also show that, within the conventional model of strategies, Nash equilibrium is preserved by bisimilarity in certain two-player games as well as in the class of concurrent game structures that are induced by iterated Boolean games [GHW15b] , a framework that can be used to reason about the strategic behaviour of AI, autonomous, and multi-agent systems [WGH + 16] . Our main invariance results are summarised in Table 1. 1.1. A Motivating Example. So far we have mentioned some cases where one needs or desires a property to be invariant under bisimilarity. However, one may still wonder why it is so important that the particular property of having a Nash equilibrium is preserved under bisimilarity. One reason has its roots in automated formal verification. To illustrate this, imagine that the system of Figure 1 is given as input to a verification tool. It is likely that such a tool will try to perform as many optimisations as possible to the system before any analysis is performed. Perhaps the simplest of such optimisations-as is being done by virtually every model checking tool-is to reduce the input system by merging isomorphic subtrees. This is done, e.g., when generating the ROBDD representation of a system. If such an optimisation is made, the tool will construct the (bisimilar) system in Figure 2 . (Observe that the subgraphs rooted at s 1 and s 1 are isomorphic.) However, with respect to the existence of Nash equilibria, such a transformation is unsound in the general case.
For instance, suppose that the system in Figure 1 represents a 3-player game, where each transition is labelled by the choices x, y, z made by player 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and asterisk * being a wildcard for any action for the player in the respective position. Thus, whereas players 1 and 2 can choose to play either a or b at each state, player 3 can choose between a, b, a , or b . The states are labelled by valuations xy over {p, q}, wherex indicates that x is set to false. Assume that player 1 would like p to be true sometime, that player 2 would like q to be true sometime, and that player 3 desires to prevent both player 1 and player 2 from achieving their goals. Accordingly, their preferences/goals can, respectively, be formally represented by the LTL formulae
where, informally, Fϕ means "eventually ϕ holds" and Gϕ means "always ϕ holds". Moreover, given these players' goals and the conventional model of strategies, we will see later in Section 4 that the system in Figure 1 has a Nash equilibrium, whereas no Nash equilibria exists in the (bisimilar) concurrent system presented in Figure 2 . This example illustrates a major issue when analysing (the existence of) Nash equilibria in the most widely used models of strategies and multi-player games in the computer science literature, namely, that even the simplest and most innocuous optimisations commonly used in automated verification are not necessarily sound with respect to game-theoretic analyses.
Because the problem is so fundamental, one may wonder whether bisimilarity is not the right behavioural equivalence for multi-player games, or whether Nash equilibrium is not the right solution concept for game-theoretic analyses of concurrent and multi-agent systems modelled as multi-player games. We will discuss these questions in more detail in Section 8, as we do not have a definite answer, but for now we would like to make a couple of observations. On the one hand, that our results also hold both for "alternating" (bisimilarity) relations, as defined in [AHKV98] , which are intended to capture strategic behaviour in multi-player games, as well as for trace equivalence, as defined in CSP [BHR84] , an equivalence much weaker than bisimilarity. On the other hand, that our negative results also hold for solution concepts stronger than Nash equilibrium, e.g., for strong and subgameperfect Nash equilibria, suggesting that the problem is not a particular defect of Nash equilibrium. Indeed, we think that the issue underlying the mismatch between bisimilarity and Nash equilibrium lies elsewhere. We will propose a very general solution to this problem, that is, a way to reconcile bisimilarity and Nash equilibrium, based on a new definition of strategy in a multi-player game. To do this, some concepts and definitions have to be introduced first.
Preliminaries
We begin by introducing the main notational conventions, models, and technical concepts used in this paper.
Lemma 3.1. Let M and M be bisimilar concurrent game structures and i a player. Then, every computation-based strategy for i in M is also a computation-based strategy for i in M , and every trace-based strategy for i in M is also a trace-based strategy for i in M . Moreover, for every computation-based profile f for M we have that κ M (f ) = κ M (f ), and for every trace-based profile g that κ M (g) = κ M (g).
Proof.
First, let f i be a computation-based strategy for i in M . We show that f i is also a computation-based strategy for i in M . To this end, consider an arbitrary κ ∈ comps M . Let π M (κ) = t 0 , . . . , t k . It suffices to prove that f i (κ) ∈ Ac i (t k ). To see this, first observe that by Lemma 2.2 also κ ∈ comps M and let π M (κ) = s 0 , . . . , s k . In virtue of Lemma 2.1, then s k ∼ t k . Moreover, because f i is a computation-based strategy for i in M , we have f i (κ) ∈ Ac i (s k ). Now consider any legal direction d k = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) at s k with a i = f i (κ). Then, there is some state
The case if g i is a trace-based strategy for i in M is similar. We then have to prove that g i is also a trace-based strategy for i in M as well. To this end, consider an arbitrary finite trace τ ∈ traces M and run π = t 0 , . . . , t k such that τ = λ M (t 0 ), . . . , λ M (t k ). It then suffices to prove that g i (τ ) ∈ Ac i (t k ). We may assume that π is induced by a computation κ ∈ comps M , that is, π = π M (κ). By Lemma 2.2 we have κ ∈ comps M and by Lemma 2.3 both π M (κ)∼ π M (κ) and τ M (κ) = τ M (κ). Let π M (κ) = s 0 , . . . , s k . Hence, s k ∼ t k . As g i is a run-based strategy for i in M we have g i (τ ) ∈ Ac i (s k ). Let, furthermore, d = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) be a legal direction at s k with a i = g i (τ ). Then, there is some
For the second part of the lemma, let f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) be a computation-based strategy profile in M . Then, f is a computation-based strategy profile in M as well. Let κ M (f ) = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . and κ M (f ) = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . . We show by induction on k that for every k ≥ 0 we have d k = d k . For k = 0, immediately, d 0 = (f 1 ( ), . . . , f n ( )) = d 0 . For the induction step we may assume that d 0 , . . . , d k = d 0 , . . . , d k . Hence,
Finally, let g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) be a trace-based strategy profile. Again we let κ M (f ) = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . and κ M (f ) = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . and show by induction on k that for every k ≥ 0 we have that d k = d k . If k = 0, observe that having assumed M ∼ M also s 0
For the induction step, we may assume that d 0 , . . . , d k = d 0 , . . . , d k and by Lemma 2.3, moreover, τ M (d 0 , . . . , d k ) = τ M (d 0 , . . . , d k ). Now the following equations hold:
which concludes the proof. With the states of bisimilar structures possibly being distinct, however, a statement analogous to Lemma 3.1 cannot be shown to hold for run-based strategies.
Preferences and Goals. We assume the agents of a concurrent game structure to have preferences on basis of which they choose their strategies. Formally, we specify the preferences of a player i of a CGS M as a subset Γ i of computations, that is, Γ i ⊆ comps ω M and refer to Γ i as i's goal set. Player i is then understood to (strictly) prefer computations in Γ i to those not in Γ i and to be indifferent otherwise. Accordingly, each player's preferences are dichotomous, only distinguishing between the preferred computations in Γ i and the not preferred ones not in Γ i . Formally, player i is said to weakly prefer computation κ to computation κ if κ ∈ Γ i whenever κ ∈ Γ i , and to strictly prefer κ to κ if i weakly prefers κ to κ but not the other way round. If i both weakly prefers κ to κ and weakly prefers κ to κ, player i is said to be indifferent between κ and κ .
Our choice to assume the players' preferences to be computation-based preferences-that is, to model their goals as sets of computations rather than, say, sets of runs or sets of traces-is for technical convenience and flexibility. Recall that every set of runs induces a set of computations, namely the set of computations that give rise to the same runs, and similarly for every set of traces. Thus, we say that a goal set Γ i ⊆ comps ω M is run-based if for any two computations κ and κ with ρ(κ) = ρ(κ ) we have that κ ∈ Γ i if and only if κ ∈ Γ. Similarly, Γ i is said to be trace-based whenever τ (κ) = τ (κ ) implies κ ∈ Γ i if and only if κ ∈ Γ i . In other words, in our setting, formally, run-based goals are computation-based goals closed under induced runs, and trace-based goals are computation-based goals closed under induced traces. 1 Sometimes-as we did in the example in the introduction-players' goals are specified by temporal logic formulae [DGL16] . As the satisfaction of goals only depends on traces, they will directly correspond to trace-based goals, given our formalisation of goals and preferences.
Games and Nash Equilibrium. With the above definitions in place, we are now in a position to define a game on a concurrent game structure M (also called a CGS-game) with Ag = {1, . . . , n} as a tuple G = (M, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ), where, for each player i in M , the set Γ i ⊆ comps ω M is a goal set specifying i's dichotomous preferences over the computations in M .
In a CGS-game the players can all play either computation-based strategies, run-based strategies, or trace-based strategies. For each such choice of type of strategies, with the set of players and their preferences specified, every CGS-game defines a strategic game in the standard game-theoretic sense. Observe that the set of strategies is infinite in general. Thus the game-theoretic solution concept of Nash equilibrium becomes available for the analysis of games on concurrent game structures. If f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is a strategy profile and g i a strategy for player i, we write (f −i , g i ) for the strategy profile (f 1 , . . . , g i , . . . , f n ), which is 1 We do not directly consider sets of runs or sets of traces as possible models of players' preferences in this paper-formally, they are induced sets of computations. Accordingly, when talking about preferences, we need not make the distinction between 'run-based' ('trace-based') and 'run-invariant' ('trace-invariant') as we do for strategies. Our run-based preferences and trace-based preferences can with as much justification be referred to as run-invariant preferences and trace-invariant preferences, respectively. identical to f except that i's strategy is replaced by g i . Formally, given a CGS-game, we say that a profile f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) of computation-based strategies is a Nash equilibrium in computation-based strategies (or computation-based equilibrium) if, for every player i and every computation-based strategy g i available to i,
The concepts of Nash equilibrium in run-based strategies and Nash equilibrium in tracebased strategies are defined analogously, where, importantly, the strategies in f −i and g i are required to be of the same type, that is, either they are all run-based or they are all trace-based. If κ(f ) / ∈ Γ i whereas κ(f −i , g i ) ∈ Γ i , we also say that player i would like to deviate from f (and play g i instead). Thus, a run-based profile f is a run-based equilibrium whenever no player would like to deviate from it and play some run-based strategy different from f i . Similarly, a trace-based profile f is a trace-based equilibrium if no player likes to deviate and play another trace-based strategy.
We say that a computation κ, run ρ, or a trace τ is sustained by a Nash equilibrium f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) (of any type) whenever κ = κ(f ), ρ = ρ(f ), and τ = τ (f ), respectively. We also refer to a computation, run, or trace that is sustained by a Nash equilibrium as an equilibrium computation, equilibrium run, and equilibrium trace, respectively.
Computation-based equilibrium is a weaker notion than run-based equilibrium, in the sense that if f is a run-based equilibrium there is also a corresponding computation-based equilibrium, but not necessarily the other way round. Run-based equilibrium, in turn, is in a similar way a weaker concept than trace-based equilibrium. As computation-based, runbased, and trace-based strategies are set-theoretically of different types, a comparison cannot be made directly. To make the comparison precise, we therefore identify two subclasses of computation-based strategies, run-invariant strategies and trace-invariant strategies, that characterise the behaviour of, respectively, run-based and trace-based strategies.
We say that a computation-based strategy f i :
, for all κ, κ ∈ comps M . Observe that thus a strategy f i being trace-invariant implies f i being run-invariant, but not necessarily the other way around.
We observe that there are one-to-one correspondences between run-based strategies on the one hand and run-invariant computation-based strategies on the other, and similarly between trace-based strategies and trace-invariant computation-based strategies. Let f i : runs M → Ac be a run-based strategy. Then definef i : comps M → Ac as the computation-based strategy such that for every finite computation κ ∈ comps M we havef i (κ) = f i (π M (κ)). A similar statment holds if g i : traces M → Ac is a trace-based strategy. Then, defineǧ i : comps → Ac i as the computation-based strategy such that for every finite computation κ ∈ comps M we haveǧ i (κ) = g i (τ M (κ)).
Lemma 3.2. For run-based strategies f i and trace-based strategies g i , the mapping that transforms f i intof i and the mapping that transforms g i intoǧ i are both one-to-one.
Proof. Let f i a run-based strategy. We first show thatf i is run-invariant. To this end, let κ, κ ∈ comps M be computations such that π M (κ) = π M (κ ). Then,
To show that the mapping is onto, let g i be an arbitrary run-invariant strategy. Now define run-based strategyĝ i such that, for every run π ∈ runs M and κ ∈ comps M with π = π M (κ) we haveĝ i (π) = g i (κ). Observe thatĝ i is well-defined since, by run-invariance of g i , for all κ, κ ∈ comps M with π M (κ) = π M (κ ) = π we have that g i (κ) = g i (κ ).
Finally, to see that the mapping is injective, let f i and f i be two distinct run-based strategies. Then, there is a run π ∈ runs M such that f i (π) = f i (π). We may assume the existence of a computation κ ∈ comps M such that π M (κ) = π. Then,
as desired. This concludes the proof.
Furthermore, each profile of run-invariant strategies induces the same computation in a concurrent game structure as its run-based counterpart. A similar remark applies to trace-invariant and trace-based profiles.
. . , f n ) be a run-based profile and g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) a trace-based profile. Then,
and
. . , f n (π M ( ))) = (f 1 ( ), . . . ,f n ( )) = d 0 . For the induction step, we may assume that d 0 , . . . , d k = d 0 , . . . , d k . Now the following equalities hold.
d k+1 = (f 1 (π M (d 0 , . . . , d k )), . . . , f n (π M (d 0 , . . . , d k ))) = (f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ), . . . ,f n (d 0 , . . . , d k ))
We may conclude that d 0 , . . . , d k+1 = d 0 , . . . , d k+1 . The argument for trace-based and trace-invariant strategies runs along analogous lines, mutatis mutandis.
We say that a computation-based profile f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is a run-invariant equilibrium in a CGS-game if f is run-invariant and no player i wishes to deviate from f and play another run-invariant strategy f i . Similarly, a computation-based profile f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is a trace-invariant equilibrium in a CGS-game if f is trace-invariant and no player i wishes to deviate from f and play another trace-invariant strategy f i . As an immediate consequence of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 we have the following corollary. . . , f n ) and g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) be a run-based profile, respectively, a trace-based profile in a CGS-game G = (M, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) based on M . Then, (1) f is a run-based equilibrium if and only iff is a run-invariant equilibrium , (2) g is a trace-based equilibrium if and only ifǧ is a trace-invariant equilibrium.
Proof. For the run-based case, the following equivalences hold by virtue of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3: 
The proof of the second part is by an analogous argument, mutatis mutandis.
Computation-based strategies grant a player more strategic flexibility than do runinvariant strategies. A similar remark applies to run-invariant strategies and trace-invariant strategies. Still, we find that, if a player i wishes to deviate from a computation-based profile f and play another computation-based strategy, i would also like to deviate by playing a run-invariant or even a trace-invariant strategy. This insight underlies the following result. 2 Theorem 3.5. Let f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) be a run-invariant profile and g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) a trace-invariant profile in CGS-game G = (M, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) based on M . Then, (1) f is a run-invariant equilibrium if and only if f is a computation-based equilibrium, (2) g is a trace-invariant equilibrium if and only if g is a computation-based equilibrium.
Proof. For part 1, first assume that f is a run-invariant equilibrium in G. For a contradiction assume moreover that f is not a computation-based equilibrium. Then, there is a player i and a computation-based strategy f i such that
. Observe that f i need not be run-invariant. We therefore define strategy f i for player i such that f i ( ) = f i ( ) and, for all finite computations d 0 , . . . , d k ,
As f i is run-invariant, this definition guarantees that f i is run-invariant as well. Let
. . . We prove by induction on k that d 0 , . . . , d k = d 0 , . . . , d k , for every k ≥ 0, and hence that κ
For the induction step, we may assume that d 0 , . . . , d k = d 0 , . . . , d k . and the following equalities hold:
Observe that the second equality holds by virtue of the definition of f i and π M (d 0 , . . . ,
and, as f i is run-invariant, moreover that f is not a run-invariant equilibrium, a contradiction. For the opposite direction, assume for contraposition that f is not a run-invariant equilibrium. Then, there is some player i who would like to deviate from f and play some run-invariant strategy f i . As run-invariant strategies are strategy-based by definition, it follows that f is not a computation-based equilibrium either. Part 2 follows by an analogous argument, mutatis mutandis.
Theorem 3.5 does not preclude the existence of computation-based equilibria that fail to be run-invariant or trace-invariant, that is, the three equilibrium concepts-computationbased, run-invariant, and trace-invariant equilibrium-are not equivalent. However, they can be ordered with respect to how restrictive they are, that is, with respect to the sets of profiles they exclude as solutions.
Proof. Merely observe that if f is a run-invariant equilibrium, it is also a run-invariant profile. If f is moreover trace-invariant it is also run-invariant. The result then immediately follows from Theorem 3.5.
On basis of the findings in this section, we may with justification claim that every trace-based equilibrium corresponds to a run-based equilibrium, and that every run-based equilibrium corresponds with some computation-based equilibrium, even if the converses of these statements do not generally hold.
Invariance of Nash Equilibria under Bisimilarity
From a computational point of view, one may expect games based on bisimilar concurrent game structures and with identical players' preferences to exhibit similar properties, in particular with respect to their Nash equilibria. We find that that this is indeed the case for games with computation-based strategies as well as for games with trace-based strategies. Recall that (finite) computations and (finite) traces are unaffected by (state-splitting and state-merging) operations on CGSs that preserve bisimilarity (Lemma 2.2). As a consequence the sets of computation-based strategies and trace-based strategies available to an again are the same in bisimilar CGSs (Lemma 3.1), providing the intuitive basis for these observations.
For games with run-based strategies the situation is considerably more complicated. Here, a key observation is that, by contrast to computation-based and trace-based strategies, there need not be a natural one-to-one mapping between the sets of run-based strategies in bisimilar concurrent game models. By restricting attention to so-called bisimulation-invariant run-based strategies, however, we find that order can be restored.
Invariance under Bisimilarity and Preference Types. We are primarily interested in the Nash equilibria of games that are the same up to bisimilarity of the underlying concurrent game structures. The Nash equilibria of a game, however, essentially depend on the players' preferences. Accordingly, the Nash equilibria of two bisimilar CGS-games can only be meaningfully compared if we also we assume that the players' preferences in these two games are identical. We formalised players' preferences as sets of computations, and, due to Lemma 2.2, this enables a straightforward comparison of players' goal sets across bisimilar concurrent game structures. In Section 3, we also distinguished run-based and trace-based preferences, that is, goal sets closed under computations that induce the same runs and traces, respectively. We are also interested in the invariance of the existence of Nash equilibria in games on bisimilar concurrent game structures where the players' preferences games are what we will call congruent, that is, both the same and of the same type in both games.
For computation-based and trace-based preferences the issue of congruence is moot. Observe that for bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M , if a goal set Γ i is computation-based in M , then it is also computation-based in M . Due to Lemma 2.3, the same holds for trace-based preferences.
This preservation of preference type under bisimilarity, however, does not extend to run-based preferences. To see this, consider Figure 3 and let the goal set Γ i of some player i be given by all computations κ = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . with d 0 = (a, a). Then, obviously, Γ i is run-based in the game G 2 based on M 2 on the left, but not in the game G 3 based on M 3 to the right. To see the latter, consider any computation
. By contrast, the goal set given by all computations
Computation-based Strategies. If strategies are computation-based, players can have their actions depend on virtually all information that is available in the system. In an important sense full transparency prevails and different actions can be chosen on bisimilar states provided that the computations that led to them are different. Moreover, the strategies available to players in bisimilar concurrent game structures are identical. Thus we obtain our first main result.
Theorem 4.1. Let G = (M, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) and G = (M , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) be games on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M , respectively, and let f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) be a computationbased profile. Then, f is a Nash equilibrium in computation-based strategies in G if and only if f is a Nash equilibrium in computation-based strategies in G .
Proof. First assume for contraposition that f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is not a Nash equilibrium in computation-based strategies in M . Then, there is a player i and a strategy g
Observe that, as the computation-based strategies of players in bisimilar structures coincide (cf., Lemma 3.1), f is also a strategy profile in M and g i a strategy for i in M . Moreover, recall that the computations induced by the same strategy profile in different but bisimilar structures are identical (cf., second part of Lemma 3.1). This yields
We may conclude that f is not a computation-based equilibrium in M either. The opposite direction follows by an analogous argument.
Theorem 4.1 holds for computation-based preferences. As run-based preferences and trace-based preferences are computation-based preferences of a special kind, the result immediately extends to games in which the players' preferences are run-based in both games or trace-based preferences in both games. As a consequence of Theorem 4.1, moreover, we find that sustenance of runs and traces by computation-based equilibrium is also preserved under bisimilarity. The argument for part 2 runs along analogous lines. First assume that τ is sustained by computation-based equilibrium f , that is, τ = τ M (f ). By Theorem 4.1, we have that f is a computation-based equilibrium in G as well. Now consider κ M (f ). By Lemma 3.1 then κ M (f ) = κ M (f ). Lemma 2.3 then yields τ M (κ M (f )) = τ M (κ M (f )). It thus follows that τ is sustained by f , a computation based Nash equilibrium, in G . The argument in the opposite direction is analogous, giving the result.
Trace-based Strategies. As we saw in Lemma 2.2, the sets of (finite) traces of two bisimilar concurrent game structures coincide. Lemma 3.1 shows that the same holds for the trace-based strategies that are available to the players. As a consequence, we can directly compare their trace-based Nash-equilibria. We find that, like computation-based equilibria, trace-based Nash equilibria are preserved in CGS-games based on bisimilar concurrent game structures.
Theorem 4.3. Let G = (M, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) and G = (M , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) be games on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M , respectively, and f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) be a trace-based strategy profile. Then, f is a Nash equilibrium in trace-based strategies in G if and only if f is a Nash equilibrium in trace-based strategies in G .
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one for Theorem 4.1 for the computation-based case. First assume for contraposition that f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is not a Nash equilibrium in trace-based strategies in M . Then, there is a player i and a trace-based strategy bisimilar structures coincide (cf., Lemma 3.1), we have that f is also a trace-based strategy profile in M and g i a trace-based strategy for i in M . By the second part of Lemma 3.1,
We may conclude that f is not a trace-based equilibrium in M either. The opposite direction follows by an analogous argument.
Like Theorem 4.1, this result is for computation-based preferences in general, and as such immediately extends to the case in which the players' preferences are stipulated to be run-based in both games or trace-based in both games. Theorem 4.3 has further the following result as an immediate consequence, which is analogous to Corollary 4.2. Proof. The proof is analogous to the one for Corollary 4.2.
Run-based Strategies. The positive results obtained using computation-based and tracebased strategies are now followed by a negative result, already mentioned in the introduction of the paper, which establishes that Nash equilibria in run-based strategies-the most widelyused strategy model in logic, computer science, and AI-are not preserved by bisimilarity. Previously we observed that the players' run-based strategies cannot straightforwardly be identified across two different concurrent game structures, even if they are bisimilar. We would therefore have to establish a correspondence between the run-based strategies in the one game and the run-based strategies in the other in an arguably ad hoc way. To cut this Gordian knot, we therefore show in this section the stronger result that the very existence of run-based equilibria is not preserved under bisimilarity. That is, we can have two bisimilar concurrent game structures, say M and M , on which we base two games G and G with congruent preferences, such that G has a Nash equilibrium and G does not.
Theorem 4.5. The existence of run-based Nash equilibria is not preserved under bisimilarity. That is, there are games (M, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) and (M , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M such that a Nash equilibrium in run-based strategies exists in G but not in G .
To see that the above statement holds, consider again the three-player game G 0 on the concurrent game structure M 0 in Figure 1 . Assume, as before, that player 1's goal set Γ 1 is given by those computations κ such that
. . and q ∈ v k for some k ≥ 0 and Γ 3 by those computations κ with τ M 0 (κ) = v 0 , v 1 , v 2 , . . . and v k = ∅ for all k ≥ 0. Recall that, consequently, the preferences of players 1, 2, and 3 are trace-based and can be represented by the LTL formulas γ 1 = Fp, γ 2 = Fq, and γ 3 = G¬(p ∨ q), respectively.
Let f * 1 and f * 2 be any run-based strategies for players 1 and 2 such that f * 1 (s 0 ) = f * 2 (s 0 ) = a. Let, furthermore, player 3's run-based strategy f * 3 be such that f * 3 (s 0 ) = a, f * 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a , and f * 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b. Let f * = (f * 1 , f * 2 , f * 3 ) and observe that ρ M 0 (f * ) = s 0 , s 4 , s 4 , s 4 , . . . . Accordingly, player 3 has her goal achieved and does not want to deviate from f * . Players 1 and 2 do not have their goals achieved, but do not want to deviate from f * either. To see this, let g 1 be any run-based strategy for 1 such that g 1 (s 0 ) = b; observe that this is required for any meaningful deviation from f * by 1. Then
. . , depending on whether f * 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b or f * 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a, respectively. In either case, player 1 does not get his goal achieved and it follows that he does not want to deviate from f * . An analogous argument-notice that the roles of player 1 and 2 are symmetric-shows that player 2 does not want to deviate from f * either. We may thus conclude that f * is a run-based equilibrium in G 0 . Now, consider the game G 1 on concurrent game structure M 1 in Figure 2 with the players' preferences as in M 0 . It is easy to check that M 0 and M 1 are bisimilar. Still, there is no run-based equilibrium in G 1 . To see this, consider an arbitrary run-based strategy profile f = (f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ). First, assume that ρ M 1 (f ) = s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s 2 , s 2 , . . . . Then, player 1 gets his goal achieved and players 2 and 3 do not. If f 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a then f 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b and player 3 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 3 with g 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a. On the other hand, if f 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b, player 3 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 3 with g 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b. Player 3 would similarly like to deviate from f if we assume that ρ M 1 (f ) = s 0 , s 1 , s 3 , s 3 , s 3 . . . , in whose case it is player 2 who gets his goal achieved. Now, assume that ρ M 1 (f ) = s 0 , s 1 , s 4 , s 4 , s 4 . . . . In this case player 3 does get her goal achieved, but players 1 and 2 do not. However, player 1 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 1 with g 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b or g 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a, depending on whether f 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a or f 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b; in a similar fashion, player 2 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 2 with g 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b if f 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a , and to one with g 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a if f 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b . Finally, assume that ρ M 1 (f ) = s 0 , s 4 , s 4 , s 4 , . . . . Then, neither player 1 nor player 2 gets his goal achieved. Now either f 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ {a, b} or f 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ {a , b }. If the former, player 1 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 1 with g 1 (s 0 ) = f 1 (s 0 ) and g 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = f 3 (s 0 , s 1 ). If the latter, player 2 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 2 with g 2 (s 0 ) = f 2 (s 0 ) and either g 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b if f 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a or g 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a if f 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b . We can then conclude that the CGS-game G 1 does not have any run-based Nash equilibria.
The main idea behind this counter-example is that in G 0 player 3 could distinguish which player deviates from f * if the state reached after the first round is not s 4 : if that state is s 1 , it was player 1 who deviated, otherwise player 2. By choosing either a or b at s 1 , and either a or b at s 1 , player 3 can guarantee that neither player 1 nor player 2 gets his goal achieved ("punish" them) and thus deter them from deviating from f * . This possibility to punish deviations from f * by players 1 and 2 in a single strategy is not available in the game on M 1 : choosing from a and b will induce a deviation by player 1, choosing from a and b one by player 2.
Observe that the games G 0 and G 1 do not constitute a counter-example against either the preservation under bisimilarity of computation-based equilibria or the preservation of trace-based equilibria. The reasons why such games fail to do so, however, are different. For the setting of computation-based strategies, player 3 can still distinguish and "punish" the deviating player in G 1 as (a, b, a) and (b, a, a) are different directions and player 3 can still have his action at s 1 depend on which of these is played at s 0 . By contrast, if we assume trace-based strategies, player 3 has to choose the same action at both s 1 and s 1 in G 0 . As a consequence, and contrarily to computation-based equilibria, trace-based equilibria exist in neither G 0 nor G 1 . Also note that the goal sets Γ 1 , Γ 2 , and Γ 3 are run-based as well as computation-based both in G 1 and G 2 . Accordingly, the counter-example also applies to settings wherein the players' preferences are assumed to be finer-grained in these two ways.
Observe at this point that s 1 and s 1 are bisimilar states. Yet, players are allowed to have run-based strategies (which depend on state histories only) that choose different actions at bisimilar states. The above counter-example shows how this relative richness of strategies makes a crucial difference. This raises the question as to whether we actually want players to adopt run-based strategies in which they choose different actions at bisimilar states. This observation leads us to the next section.
Bisimulation-invariant Run-based Strategies. Bisimilarity formally captures an informal concept of observational indistinguishability on the part of an external observer of the system. Now, the players in a concurrent game structure are in essentially the same situation as an external observer if they are assumed to be only able to observe the behaviour of the other players, without knowing their internal structure or their interaction.
Drawing on this idea of indistinguishability, it is natural that players cannot distinguish statewise bisimilar runs and, as a consequence, can only adopt strategies that choose the same action at runs that are statewise bisimilar. The situation is comparable to the one in extensive games of imperfect information, in which players are required to choose the same action in histories that are in the same information set, that is, histories that cannot be distinguished (cf., e.g., [OR94, MSZ13] ).
To make this idea formally precise, we say that a run-based strategy f i is bisimulationinvariant if f i (π) = f i (π ) for all histories π and π that are statewise bisimilar. The concept of Nash equilibrium is then similarly restricted to bisimulation-invariant strategies. A profile f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) of bisimulation-invariant strategies is a Nash equilibrium in bisimulationinvariant strategies (or a bisimulation-invariant equilibrium) in a game (M, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) if for all players i and every bisimulation-invariant strategy g i for i,
That is, f is a bisimulation-invariant equilibrium if no player wishes to deviate from f by playing a different bisimulation-invariant strategy. In contrast to the situation for general run-based strategies, we find that computations and traces that are sustained by a bisimulation-invariant Nash equilibrium are preserved by bisimulation. We show this by establishing a one-to-one correspondence between the bisimulation-invariant strategies available to the players in two bisimilar structures.
Based on the concept of state-wise bisimilarity, we associate with every bisimulationinvariant strategy f i for player i in concurrent game structure M , another bisimulationinvariant strategyf i for player i in any bisimilar concurrent game structure M such that for all π ∈ runs M and a ∈ Ac, f i (π) = a if f i (π ) = a for some π ∈ runs M with π∼ π .
Transitivity of∼ guarantees thatf i is well defined. To see this, observe that for all π , π ∈ runs M with π ∼ π and π ∼ π, we have π ∼ π . Having assumed that f i is bisimulation-invariant, then f i (π ) = f i (π ). By very much the same argument,f i is bisimulation-invariant, if f i is.
Lemma 4.6. Let M and M be bisimilar concurrent game structures and let f i be a bisimulation-invariant strategy for player i in M . Then,f i is a bisimulation-invariant strategy in M .
Proof. Consider two statewise bisimilar runs π, π ∈ runs M , that is, π∼ π . Then, there are computations κ, κ ∈ comps M such that π M (κ) = π and π M (κ ) = π . By Lemma 2.3, we have π M (κ)∼ π M (κ) and π M (κ )∼ π M (κ ). Now, transitivity of∼ yields π M (κ)∼ π M (κ ).
Having assumed that f i is bisimulation-invariant, we obtain that f i (π M (κ)) = f i (π M (κ )). Finally, we may conclude thatf i (π) =f i (π ), as desired.
Moreover, it is easily appreciated that the mapping that transforms a strategy f i into strategyf i is one-to-one. We will find that this is an essential property for bisimulationinvariant equilibria to be preserved under bisimilarity.
For a profile of bisimulation-invariant strategies f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) in M we denotẽ f = (f 1 , . . . ,f n ). We then find that profiles f andf of bisimulation-invariant strategies induce identical computations. 
For the induction step, we may assume that d 0 , . . . , d k = d 0 , . . . , d k . By Lemma 2.3, then π M (d 0 , . . . , d k )∼ π M (d 0 , . . . , d k ). Accordingly, for every player i we have that f i (π M (d 0 , . . . , d k )) =f i (π M (d 0 , . . . , d k )). It thus follows that d k+1 = (f 1 (π M (d 0 , . . . , d k )), . . . ,f n (π M (d 0 , . . . , d k ))) = (f 1 (π M (d 0 , . . . , d k )), . . . , f n (π M (d 0 , . . . , d k ))) = d k+1 .
This concludes the proof.
We are now in a position to state an equilibrium preservation theorem for bisimulationinvariant strategies in a similar way as we were able to obtain Theorem 4.1, the analogous result for computation-based and trace-based strategies. Proof. First assume for contraposition thatf = (f 1 , . . . ,f n ) is not a Nash equilibrium in bisimulation-invariant strategies in G . Then, there is a player i and a bisimulation-invariant strategy g i for i in M such that κ M (f ) / ∈ Γ i and κ M (f −i , g i ) ∈ Γ i . As the mapping that transforms a strategy f i into strategyf i is one-to-one, there is a bisimulation-invariant
it follows that f is not an equilibrium in bisimulation-invariant strategies in G.
The proof in the opposite direction runs along analogous lines.
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 4.8, it follows that the property of a computation or trace to be sustained by a bisimulation-invariant equilibria is also preserved under bisimilarity. 
Special Cases
In the previous section we provided results about the preservation of a given Nash equilibrium under bisimilarity, specifically, as long as we do not consider run-based strategies or goals. In this section we study two important special scenarios where this is not the case.
Firstly, consider the scenario where we have two-player games with run-based strategies and trace-based goals. This is an important special case since run-based strategies, as we emphasised in the introduction, are the "conventional" model of strategies used in logics such as ATL * or SL, as well as in systems represented as concurrent game structures. In particular, we show that with respect to two-player games with run-based strategies and trace-based goals (which include temporal logic goals), the setting coincides with the one with bisimulation-invariant strategies and trace-based goals, for which the preservation of Nash equilibria under bisimilarity holds. A key observation in this case is that in two-player games the existence of Nash equilibria can be characterised in terms of the existence of certain winning strategies, which are preserved across bisimilar systems.
Secondly, we also study the scenario where concurrent game structures are restricted to those that are induced by iterated Boolean games [GHW15b] and Reactive Modules games [WGH + 16], two frameworks for the strategic analysis of AI and multi-agent systems, in particular, using model checking techniques. 3 In this case, we show that bisimulationinvariant strategies also coincide with run-based strategies, and therefore, that the positive results for bisimulation-invariant strategies presented in the previous section also transfer to this special case. Two-Player Games. This section concerns the preservation under bisimilarity of Nash equilibria under bisimulation in two-player games. We deal with the cases in which the players' preferences are computation-based, trace-based, and run-based separately.
Computation-based Preferences. The counter-example against the preservation of the existence of Nash equilibria in Section 4 involved three players. We find that, if preferences are computation-based, the example can be adapted so as to involve only two players, which gives rise to the following result. By an argument analogous to that presented in Section 4, it can then be appreciated that G 4 has a run-based equilibrium, whereas G 5 has not. To see the former, observe that any run-based profile f * = (f * 1 , f * 2 ) will be an equilibrium if f * 1 (s 0 ) = f * 2 (s 0 ) = a, f * 2 (s 1 ) ∈ {a , b }, and f * 2 (s 1 ) ∈ {a, b}. For every strategy g 1 for player 1, we then have κ
Then, if f 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a, player 1 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 1 with g 1 (s 0 ) = g 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b; if f 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a , to deviate and play a strategy g 1 with g 1 (s 0 ) = c and g 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b; if f 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b to deviate and play a strategy g 1 with g 1 (s 0 ) = b and g 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a; and, finally, if f 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b to deviate and play a strategy g 1 with g 1 (s 0 ) = c and g 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a. On the other hand, if κ M 3 (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 2 , it must be the case that f 1 (s 0 ) ∈ {b, c}. Observe, however, that player 2 would then like to deviate and play any strategy g 2 with g 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a if f 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a and to a strategy g 2 with g 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b if f 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b. As, furthermore, Γ 1 and Γ 2 are disjoint, that is, the goals players 1 and 2 cannot simultaneously be satisfied, it follows that G 5 has no run-based equilibria.
Run-based Preferences. We now address the preservation (of the existence) of Nash equilibria in two-player CGS-games where both preferences and strategies are run-based. In contrast to our findings in the previous section, we find that, under a natural closure restriction on the players' preferences, we are able to obtain a positive result. Our proof relies on the equivalence of run-based profiles and run-invariant profiles as expounded in Section 3.
As already noted above, run-based strategies cannot generally be identified directly across bisimilar CGS-games. The reason for this complication is that runs are sequences of states, and the sets of states of the two CGS-games need not coincide. In Section 3, we saw, however, how run-based strategies correspond to run-invariant strategies, which are computation-based by definition. Lemma 2.2, moreover, allows us to compare computation-based strategies, even if they may be run-invariant in the one model but not in the other.
Let f = (f 1 , f 2 ) be a given run-invariant equilibrium in a CGS-game G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) based on M and let G = (M , Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) be a CGS-game based on a concurrent game structure M bisimilar to M . We define a (computation-based) profile f K = (f K 1 , f K 2 ) that is a run-invariant equilibrium in both G and G . To prove that f K = (f K 1 , f K 2 ) is a run-invariant equilibrium if f = (f 1 , f 2 ) is, we exploit a characterisation of Nash equilibria in terms of winning strategies. 4 We say that a run-invariant strategy f i for player i is winning against 4 Winning strategies have also been used to characterise the existence of Nash equilibria in other two-player games with binary outcomes-see, e.g., [GHW15a, GW14] . player j whenever κ M (f i , f j ) / ∈ Γ j for all run-invariant strategies f j of player j. We then have the following lemma, which is independent of the type of preferences that players have.
Lemma 5.2. Let G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) be a game. Then, a profile f = (f 1 , f 2 ) is a run-invariant equilibrium if and only if both (1) κ M (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 1 implies that f 2 is a winning strategy against player 1, and (2) κ M (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 2 implies that f 1 is a winning strategy against player 2.
Proof. For the "if" direction assume for contraposition that f = (f 1 , f 2 ) is not a run-invariant equilibrium. Then, either κ M (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 1 and κ M (g 1 , f 2 ) ∈ Γ 1 for some run-invariant strategy g 1 for player 1, or κ M (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 2 and κ M (f 1 , g 2 ) ∈ Γ 2 for some run-invariant strategy g 2 for player 2. If the former, f 2 is not winning against player 1, refuting 1. If the latter, f 1 is not winning against player 2, which refutes 2.
The opposite direction is also by contraposition. Assume that either 1 or 2 is not satisfied. Without loss of generality we may assume the former. Then, κ M (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 1 and f 2 is not a winning strategy against player 1. Accordingly, there is some run-invariant strategy g 1 for player 1 such that κ M (g 1 , f 2 ) ∈ Γ 1 and it follows that f = (f 1 , f 2 ) is not a run-invariant equilibrium.
In order to have a formally convenient characterisation of the goal sets Γ 1 and Γ 2 to be run-based in two bisimilar CGS-games and to define the profile f K = (f K 1 , f K 2 ), we furthermore introduce the following notations and auxiliary concepts. For a concurrent game structure M and finite computations κ, κ ∈ comps M , we write κ ≡ M κ if π M (κ) = π M (κ). Furthermore, we say that finite computations κ and κ are finitely congruent in M and M , in symbols κ ≡ K M,M κ , whenever there are (not necessarily distinct) intermediate computations κ 0 , . . . , κ m such that (1) κ = κ 0 , (2) κ = κ m , and (3) κ j ≡ M κ j+1 or κ j ≡ M κ j+1 , for every 0 ≤ j < m. As ≡ M and ≡ M are equivalence relations, we may assume that here ≡ M and ≡ M alternate and κ j ≡ M κ j+1 if j is even, and κ j ≡ M κ j+1 if j is odd. We will generally omit the subscript in K M,M when M and M are clear from the context. For an example, see again Figure 3 . Consider the (one-step) computations κ 1 = (a, a), κ 2 = (a, b), κ 3 = (b, a), and κ 4 = (b, b). Then, κ 1 ≡ M 2 ,M 3 κ 3 , because κ 1 ≡ M 3 κ 2 and κ 2 ≡ M 2 κ 3 . On the other hand, some reflection reveals that κ 1 ≡ K M 1 ,M 2 κ 4 . It is worth noting that finite congruence of two computations implies statewise bisimilarity of the runs induced, that is, Proof. Assume κ ≡ K M,M κ . Then there are κ 0 , . . . , κ m such that κ = κ 0 , κ m = κ , and, for all 0 ≤ < m, π M (κ ) = π M (κ +1 ) if is even and π M (κ ) = π M (κ +1 ) if is odd. We assume that m is even; the case where m is odd follows by the same argument mutatis mutandis. By virtue of Lemma 2.3-1, we have π M (κ )∼ π M (κ ) for every 0 ≤ < m. Hence, π M (κ 0 ) = π M (κ 1 )∼ π M (κ 1 ) = · · · = π M (κ m−1 )∼ π M (κ m−1 ) = π M (κ m ). As obviously π M (κ ) = π M (κ +1 ) and π M (κ ) = π M (κ +1 ) imply, respectively, π M (κ )∼ π M (κ +1 ) and π M (κ )∼ π M (κ +1 ), also
By transitivity of∼ we may conclude that π M (κ)∼ π M (κ).
For bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M , we say that a computation-based
, for all finite computations κ, κ ∈ comps M . We find that K M,M -invariance exactly captures the concept of a strategy that is run-invariant in two bisimilar concurrent game structures. 
The argument for f i being run-invariant in M is analogous.
For the "if"-direction, assume that f i is run-invariant in both M and M , and consider arbitrary κ, κ ∈ comps such that κ ≡ K κ . Then, we may assume that there are κ 0 , . . . , κ m such that
Having assumed that f i is run-invariant in both M and M , then also
As we have argued in Section 1, for the question whether the Nash equilibria across two bisimilar CGS-games are preserved to make sense, the players' preferences in the two games have to be congruent, that is, they have to be the same and of the same type in both games. In this section we deal with run-based preferences. We have already seen in Section 4, that identity of a player's computation-based preferences in two CGSs does not guarantee their being congruent as run-based preferences. By imposing an additional closedness restriction, however, we find that a computation-based goal set can be guaranteed to be run-based in two CGS-games based on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M . Accordingly, call a goal set Γ i K M,M -closed if for all computations κ = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . and κ = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . , we have that κ ∈ Γ i implies κ ∈ Γ i whenever d 0 , . . . , d k ≡ K M,M d 0 , . . . , d k for all k ≥ 0.
Lemma 5.5. Let G = (M, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) and G = (M , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) be CGS-games on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M , and Γ i is K M,M -closed for some player i. Then, Γ i is run-based in both M and M .
Proof. Assume that Γ i is K M,M -invariant and consider arbitrary infinite computations κ = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . and κ = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . such that ρ M (κ) = ρ M (κ ). Also assume that κ ∈ Γ i . Let ρ M (κ) = s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . and ρ M (κ ) = t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , . . . . Then, for every k ≥ 0, we also have that π M (d 0 , . . . , d k ) = s 0 , . . . , s k+1 = t 0 , . . . , t k+1 = π M (d 0 , . . . , d k ).
Having assumed Γ i to be K M,M -invariant, it follows that κ ∈ Γ i , as desired. For the remainder, let G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) and G = (M , Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) be two two-player CGSgames based on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M such that both Γ 1 and Γ 2 are K M,M -closed (and thus, in particular, run-based). We prove that if there is a run-invariant equilibrium in M , then there is also a K-invariant profile that is a run-invariant equilibrium in M . We construct for a given strategy profile
, (ii) if f 1 is a winning strategy against player 2, then so is f K 1 , (iii) if f 2 is a winning strategy against player 1, then so is f K 2 . On basis of Lemma 5.2 we may then conclude that f K corresponds to a run-invariant equilibrium in M . Having defined f K formally as a computation-based profile, by Theorem 4.1 it follows that f K is also a computation-based equilibrium in G . Finally, because f K is K M,M -invariant, we know that it furthermore corresponds to a run-invariant equilibrium in both M and M .
For an example consider the games G 6 and G 7 depicted in Figure 6 . The underlying concurrent game structures M 6 and M 7 only differ with respect to direction (a, b) at the initial state and their bisimilarity is easily established. Assume that the goal of player 1 is to see p false at some point in the future, that is, {(a, a), (a, b) , (b, a)} and d 1 = (a, c)}, and that player 2 tries to prevent this, that is, Γ 2 = comps ω \ Γ 1 . Observe that defined thus, the players' preferences are run-based in both G 6 and G 7 . Concentrating on G 6 first, define the run-invariant strategy profile f = (f 1 , f 2 ), such that,
We find that f = (f 1 , f 2 ) is a run-invariant equilibrium in G 6 . Observe, however, that f = (f 1 , f 2 ) is not run-invariant in G 7 , as f 2 (a, a) = f 2 (a, b) even though π M 7 (a, a) = π M 7 (a, b). Accordingly, f = (f 1 , f 2 ) fails as a K M 6 ,M 7 -invariant equilibrium. Let g 2 be defined such that,
Then, (f 1 , g 2 ) is readily seen to be a K M 6 ,M 7 -invariant equilibrium in G 6 . We will find that under the conditions specified, this is no coincidence and that K-invariant equilibria can be constructed from run-invariant equilibria in a systematic fashion. We first define the strategy profile f K = (f K 1 , f K 2 ). The underlying idea is to carefully choose for each finite computation d 0 , . . . , d k computations κ d 0 ,...,d k ) and
Here we give priority to prefixes of κ(f 1 , f 2 ), that is if κ(f 1 , f 2 ) = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . and d 0 , . . . ,
In a similar way, we also choose κ d 0 ,...,d k f 1 and κ d 0 ,...,d k f 2 so as to preserve the two players' punishment strategies. This guarantees that f K = (f K 1 , f K 2 ) is an equilibrium, as it inherits this property from f = (f 1 , f 2 ). 5 To do so we assume a well-ordering of the action sets Ac 1 and Ac 2 of players 1 and 2, respectively. Then, for all finite computations κ = d 0 , . . . , d k in comps M , we define inductively and simultaneously computations κ d 0 ,...,d k f 1 and κ d 0 ,...,d k f 2 as follows. For κ = we have κ f 1 = κ f 2 = , and, for κ = d 0 , . . . , d k+1 ,
. . , d k , and (i.1) x 1 = f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ) and x 2 = f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k ), if d 0 , . . . , d k , (f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ), f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k )) ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 , (i.2) y 1 = f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ) and y 2 = f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k ), if d 0 , . . . , d k , (f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ), f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k )) ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 , (ii.1) x 1 = f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ) and x 2 is the least action available to player 2 such that
if such an action x 2 exists and (i.1) does not apply, (ii.2) y 2 = f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k ) and y 1 is the least action available to player 1 such that
if such an action y 1 exists and (i.2) does not apply, (iii.1) x 1 and x 2 are the least actions available to players 1 and 2, respectively, such that d 0 , . . . , d k , (x 1 , x 2 ) ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 , if neither (i.1) nor (ii.1) apply, (iii.2) y 1 and y 2 are the least actions available to players 1 and 2, respectively, such that d 0 , . . . , d k , (x 1 , x 2 ) ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 , if neither (i.2) nor (ii.2) apply, Observe that the actions x 1 and x 2 in the definition above always exist. The reason for this is that, if d 0 , . . . , d k ≡ K M,M d 0 , . . . , d k , by Lemma 5.3 also π M (d 0 , . . . , d k )∼ π M (d 0 , . . . , d k ).
First, assume that d 0 , . . . , d k , (f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ), f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k )) ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 . Then, clause (i.1) applies and we have x 1 = f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ) and x 2 = f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k ). It then follows that d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 . Second, assume that d 0 , . . . , d k , (f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ) , y 2 ) ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 for some action y 2 ∈ Ac 2 , but
Then clause (ii.1) applies and we have that x 1 = f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ) and x 2 is the least action available to player 2 such that d 0 , . . . , d k , (f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ), y 2 ) ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 . Again, it immediately follows that d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 .
Finally, assume that neither of the above, then clause (iii.1) applies and we have that x 1 and x 2 are the least actions available to players 1 and 2 such that d 0 , . . . , d k , (x 1 , x 2 ) ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k+1 . As such actions exist, we conclude that d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 .
We are now in a position to prove the following crucial lemmas. 6
Lemma 5.7. Let f = (f 1 , f 2 ) be a run-invariant strategy profile for concurrent game structure M and f K defined as above.
. Proof. Let us use the following notations:
. It then suffices to prove by induction on k that for every k ≥ 0, we have
For k = 0, let d 0 = (a 0 1 , a 0 2 ) and d K 0 = (b 1 , b 2 ). Then, a 0 1 = f 1 ( ) = f 1 (κ f 1 ) = f K 1 ( ) = b 0 1 . In a similar way we find that a 0 2 = b 0 2 , and hence d 0 = d K 0 . Because both f 1 ( ) = a 0 1 and f 2 ( ) = a 0 2 , we also have d 0 = d 0 , and, a fortiori, d 0 ≡ K d 0 . Hence, clause (i.1) applies and therefore d 0 = (f 1 ( ), f 2 ( )) = (a 0 1 , a 0 2 ) = d 0 . In a similar way we can establish that d 0 = d 0 . For the induction step, we may assume that
Then,
Observe that the third equality holds because d 0 , . . . , d k = κ d 0 ,...,d k f 1 . For player 2, the following equalities hold:
2 . Now the third equality holds since d 0 , . . . , d k = κ d 0 ,...,d k f 2 . 6 The proofs of these two lemmas extend over a couple of pages and the reader may skip to page 33, where the running text continues. Finally, by the induction hypothesis, d 0 , . . . , d k = d 0 , . . . , d k . From the above, we already had f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ) = a k+1 1 and f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k ) = a k+1 2 Hence,
It follows that, d 0 , . . . , d k , (f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ), f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k )) = d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 . In particular,
Therefore, clause (i.1) is applicable, and both
1 and
x k+1 2 = f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k ) = a k+1 2 , signifying that d k+1 = d k+1 . By an analogous reasoning we show that d k+1 = d k+1 .
The next lemma establishes that f K 1 and f K 2 are winning run-invariant strategies against player 2 and player 1, respectively, if the goal sets Γ 1 and Γ 2 are to be run-based. Notice that this result requires Γ 1 and Γ 2 to be K M,M -closed.
Lemma 5.8. Let f = (f 1 , f 2 ) be a run-invariant strategy profile in game G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) with Γ 1 and Γ 2 run-based and K-closed, and f K defined as above. Then, (1) if f 1 is a winning (run-invariant) strategy against player 2, then so is f K 1 , (2) if f 2 is a winning (run-invariant) strategy against player 1, then so is f K 2 . Proof. For part 1, assume for contraposition that f K 1 is not winning against player 2. Then, there is a strategy g 2 for player 2 such that κ(f K 1 , g 2 ) ∈ Γ 2 . We define a K-invariant strategy g K 2 for player 2 such that d 0 , . . . , d k ≡ K e 0 , . . . , e k for every k ≥ 0, where κ(f K 1 , g 2 ) = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . and d k = (a 1 , a 2 ), κ(f 1 , g K 2 ) = e 0 , e 1 , e 2 , . . . . and e k = (b 1 , b 2 ).
By Γ 2 being K-closed it then follows that also κ(f 1 , g K 2 ) ∈ Γ 2 , which contradicts our initial assumption that f 1 is winning strategy against player 2. For each k ≥ 0, let furthermore κ d 0 ,...,d k = d 0 , . . . , d k and d k = (c 1 , c 2 ).
In order to define the strategy g K 2 , we may assume the existence of some K-invariant strategy h 2 for player 2. For the empty computation we have g K
2 is the least action y 0 2 available to player 2 such that (f 1 ( ), y k+1 For every finite computation d 0 , . . . , d k , we have that Observe that g K 2 is K-invariant by construction. We now prove by induction on k that e 0 , . . . , e k = d 0 , . . . , d k for every k ≥ 0. If k = 0, recall that e 0 = (b 0 1 , b 0 2 ) and d 0 0 = (c 0 1 , c 0 2 ). Observe that f K 1 ( ) = f 1 (κ ) = f 1 ( ). Thus we have d 0 = (f 1 ( ), g 2 ( )) = (f 1 ( ), g 2 ( )), and in particular d 0 ≡ K (f 1 ( ), g 2 ( )). Hence, there is some y 0 2 such that (f 1 ( ), y 0 2 ) ≡ K d 0 . First consider the case where (f 1 ( ), f 2 ( )) ≡ K d 0 . Now clause (i.1) applies and c 0 1 = f 1 ( ) and c 0 2 = f 2 ( ). Accordingly, clause (i.3) is applicable as well, and we obtain both
Thus, due to clause (ii.1) we have c 0 1 = f 1 ( ) and c 0 2 = x 0 2 . Clause (ii.3) now also applies and we obtain: b 0 1 = f 1 ( ) = c 0 1 and b 0 2 = g K 2 ( ) = x 0 2 = c 0 2 . The induction step runs along similar lines. We may assume that e 0 , . . . , e k = d 0 0 , . . . , d k .
(i.h.)
Observe that
). By Lemma 5.6, moreover, d 0 , . . . , d k ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k , and it follows that d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k , (f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ), g 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k )).
Hence, there is some y k+1 2 such that d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k , (f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ), y k+1 2 ).
( * )
First assume that equation ( * ) holds for y k+1 2 = f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k ). Then clause (i.1) applies and for d k+1 = (c k+1 1 , c k+1 2 ) we have c k+1
and c k+1 2 = f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k ).
Recall that e k+1 = (b k+1 1 , b k+1 2 ). Now for player 1 we find that b k+1
1 . For player 2, observe that, in the case we are considering,
Accordingly, clause (i.4) applies, that is, g K 2 (e 0 , . . . , e k ) = f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k ). Hence, b k+1 2 = g K 2 (e 0 , . . . , e k ) = f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k ) = c k+1 2 , and we may conclude that e k+1 = (b k+1 1 , b k+1 2 ) = (c k+1 1 , c k+1 2 ) = d k+1 . Finally, assume that equation ( * ) does not hold for y k+1 2 = f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k ). Then, let x k+1 2 be the least action for player 2 for which equation ( * ) does hold with y k+1 = x k+1 2 . As in this case clause (i.2) applies and for d k+1 = (c k+1 1 , c k+1 2 ), we have, c k+1
Recall that e k+1 = (b k+1 1 , b k+1 2 ). For player 1 we again find that, b k+1 1 = f 1 (e 0 , . . . , e k ) = i.h. f 1 (d 0 , . . . , d k ) = c k+1 1 . For player 2, observe that, in the case we are considering,
Accordingly, clause (ii.4) applies and we have g K 2 (e 0 , . . . , e k ) = x k+1 2 . It then follows that, b k+1 2 = g K 2 (e 0 , . . . , e k ) = f 2 (d 0 , . . . , d k ) = c k+1 2 . Again we may conclude that e k+1 = (b k+1 1 , b k+1 2 ) = (c k+1 1 , c k+1 2 ) = d k+1 , as desired. The proof for part 2 is analogous to that of part 1.
The ground has now been cleared for the main result of this paper that the existence of run-invariant equilibria is preserved under bisimulation in two-player games provided that the run-based preferences of the players are K M,M -closed.
Theorem 5.9. Let G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) and G = (M , Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) be two two-player games on bisimilar concurrent game structures such that Γ 1 and Γ 2 are run-based and K M,M -closed.
Proof. Assume that f = (f 1 , f 2 ) is a run-invariant strategy profile in M . By Lemma 5.2, then both (1) κ M (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 1 implies that f 2 is a winning strategy against player 1 in M , and (2) κ M (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 2 implies that f 1 is a winning strategy against player 2 in M . On basis of 1, Lemma 5.7 yields
∈ Γ 1 and we may assume that f 2 is a winning strategy against player 1 in M . In virtue of Lemma 5.8 we may then conclude that f K 2 is a winning strategy against player 1 in M . Assuming that κ M (f K 1 , f K 2 ) / ∈ Γ 2 , we can reason analogously and infer that f 1 is a winning strategy against player 2 in M . Hence, (1 ) κ M (f K 1 , f K 2 ) / ∈ Γ 1 implies that f K 2 is a winning strategy against player 1 in M , and (2 ) κ M (f K 1 , f K 2 ) / ∈ Γ 2 implies that f K 1 is a winning strategy against player 2 in M . Accordingly, f K is a computation-based equilibrium in M . By Theorem 4.1 we may infer that f K is also a computation-based equilibrium in M . Lemma 5.6 then guarantees that f K is K M,M -invariant, and it follows that f K is run-invariant in M as well. By virtue of Theorem 3.5 we may finally conclude that f K is also a run-invariant equilibrium in M .
Proof. Let run ρ ∈ runs ω M be sustained by a run-based equilibrium f = (f 1 , f 2 ) in G and leť f = (f 1 ,f 2 ) be the run-invariant strategy profile corresponding to f . Lemma 3.4 guarantees thatf = (f 1 ,f 2 ) is a run-invariant equilibrium in G. Now construct profilef K = (f K 1 ,f K 2 ), which by virtue of Theorem 5.9 is then K M,M -invariant and is a run-invariant equilibrium in both G and G . By virtue Lemma 2.2-1, it moreover follows that ρ
, that is, ρ M (g K 1 , g K 2 ) and ρ M (g K 1 , g K 2 ) are statewise bisimilar, which concludes the proof. A further corollary of Theorem 5.9 is that the existence of run-based equilibria is preserved in two-player games with run-based and K M,M -closed preferences.
Trace-based Preferences. We find that, with a couple of slight modifications, essentially the same construction as in the previous section can be leveraged to prove that runbased equilibria are also preserved under bisimulation in two-player games with trace-based preferences. It be emphasised that here we do not require the preferences to satisfy any other condition than being trace-based.
Let two CGS-games G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) and G = (M , Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M and with Γ 1 and Γ 2 trace-based be given. For a run-invariant equilibrium f = (f 1 , f 2 ) in game G, we define the K M,M -invariant strategy-profile f K = (f K 1 , f K 2 ) as in the previous section. We prove that f K = (f K 1 , f K 2 ) is also a run-invariant equilibrium in G . To this end, we adapt Lemma 5.8 so as to apply to trace-based preferences instead of preferences that are both run-based and K M,M -closed.
Lemma 5.11. Let f = (f 1 , f 2 ) be a run-invariant strategy profile in game G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) with Γ 1 and Γ 2 trace-based, and f K defined as above. Then, (1) if f 1 is a winning (run-invariant) strategy against player 2, then so is f K 1 , (2) if f 2 is a winning (run-invariant) strategy against player 1, then so is f K 2 . Proof. For part 1-part 2 follows by an analogous argument-assume for contraposition that f K 1 is not a winning strategy against player 2. Then, there is a strategy g 2 for player 2 such that κ(f K 1 , g 2 ) ∈ Γ 2 . We define a K M,M -invariant strategy g K 2 for player 2 exactly as in the proof of Lemma 5.8. Accordingly, d 0 , . . . , d k ≡ K M,M e 0 , . . . , e k for every k ≥ 0, where κ(f K 1 , g 2 ) = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . and d k = (a 1 , a 2 ), κ(f 1 , g K 2 ) = e 0 , e 1 , e 2 , . . . . and e k = (b 1 , b 2 ). Now consider an arbitrary k ≥ 0. Then, by Lemma 5.3, also π M (d 0 , . . . , d k )∼ π M (e 0 , . . . , e k ). Letting π M (d 0 , . . . , d k ) = s 0 , . . . , s k and π M (d 0 , . . . , d k ) = s 0 , . . . , s k , we then also have s k ∼ s k . It follows that ρ
. As a consequence of Γ 2 being trace-based, we obtain κ(f 1 , g K 2 ) ∈ Γ 2 , which contradicts our initial assumption that f 1 is winning strategy against player 2.
We are now in a position to prove the counterpart of Theorem 5.9 for trace-based preferences, showing that run-invariant equilibria are preserved under bisimulation if the players' preferences are trace-based.
Theorem 5.12. Let G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) and G = (M , Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) be two two-player games on bisimilar concurrent game structures such that Γ 1 and Γ 2 are trace-based. Run-based strategies still generalise trace-based strategies, but not other relation like this holds between any other pair of models of strategies. For instance, as shown in the example in Figure 9 , there is a system in which, for instance, a trace-based strategy can be defined (as well as a run-based strategy) while a computation-based strategy cannot.
In case strategies are well defined, as mentioned before, they can induce sets of computations, runs, and traces in a nondeterministic system, except for one case: whenever defined, a computation-based strategy always determines a unique computation of the system, whether deterministic or nondeterministic. Examples of all other cases (8 in total) are easy to build. For instance, in the nondeterministic system in Figure 9 , any run-based or trace-based strategy will induce a set of computations containing both ab ω and ac ω . Correspondingly, they will also induce a set of runs and a set of traces, namely, those containing, respectively, s 0 M s ω 1 and s 0 M s ω 2 in case of runs, and xy ω and xz ω in case of traces. For the two remaining cases, a set of runs and a set of traces induced by a computation-based strategy, consider the nondeterministic system in Figure 10 , which is almost the same as the system in Figure 9 , save that a computation-based strategy can be defined. In such a system, any well defined computation-based strategy will induce a set of runs and a set of traces containing, respectively, s 0 M s ω 1 and s 0 M s ω 2 in case of runs, and xy ω and xz ω in case of traces. Finally, the reader may have noticed that in this section we did not study the case considering run-based preferences (for run-based strategies we know that the negative results for deterministic systems carry over). The reason is that, as shown for deterministic systems, we can ensure invariance of (the existence of) Nash equilibria with respect to bisimilarity only if the sets of run-based preferences are congruent between bisimilar systems. As this is regarded as a major drawback, even for deterministic systems as illustrated in the example in Figure 11 , it is really not an interesting question to be investigated any further.
Strategy Logics: New Semantic Foundations
Several logics for strategic reasoning have been proposed in the literature of computer science and AI, such as ATL * [AHK02], Strategy Logic [MMPV14, CHP10], Coalition Logic [Pau02], Coordination Logic [FS10] , Game Logic [PP03] , and Equilibrium Logic [GHW17b] . In several cases, the model of strategies that is used is the one that we refer to as run-based in this paper, that is, strategies are functions from finite sequences of states (of some arena) to actions/decisions/choices of players in a given game. As can be seen from our results so far, of the four options we have explored, run-based strategies form the least desirable model of strategies from a semantic point of view since in such a case Nash equilibrium is not preserved under bisimilarity.
This does not necessarily immediately imply that a particular logic with a run-based strategy model is not invariant under bisimilarity. For instance, ATL * is a bisimulationinvariant logic and, as shown in [GHW15a] one can reason about Nash equilibrium using ATL * only up-to bisimilarity. A question then remains: whether any of these logics for strategic reasoning becomes invariant under bisimilarity-as explained before, a desirable property-if one changes the model of strategies considered there to, for instance, computation-based or trace-based strategies. We find that this question has a satisfactory positive answer in some cases. In particular, we will consider the above question in the context of Strategy Logic as studied in [MMPV14] , and in doing so we will provide new semantic foundations for strategy logics.
Let us start by introducing the syntax and semantics under the run-based model of strategies for Strategy Logic (SL [MMPV14] ) as it has been given in [MMPV16] . Syntactically, SL extends LTL with two strategy quantifiers, x and [ [x] ], and an agent binding operator (i, x), where i is an agent and x is a variable. Intuitively, these operators can be understood as As an immediate corollary, we then obtain the following result about the semantic relationship between the properties that can be expressed in SL and the concept of bisimilarity.
Corollary 7.2. SL with the computation-based model of strategies is invariant under bisimilarity.
Finally, an analogous statement to the above Corollary can also be proved if we consider the model of trace-based strategies, leading to the next result on the semantics of SL. 
Concluding Remarks and Related Work
In this paper we showed that with the conventional model of strategies used in the logic, computer science, and AI literatures, the existence of Nash equilibria is not necessarily preserved under bisimilarity-in particular this is the case for multi-player games played over deterministic concurrent games structures. By way of some examples, we also illustrated some of the implications of this result-for example, in the context of automated formal verification. To resolve this difficulty, we furthermore investigated alternative models of strategies which exhibit some desirable properties, in particular, allowing for a formalisation of Nash equilibrium that is invariant under bisimilarity, even on nondeterministic systems.
We studied applications of these models and found that through their use, not only Nash equilibria become invariant under bisimilarity, but also full logics such as Strategy Logic. This renders it possible to combine commonly used optimisation techniques for model checking with decision procedures for the analysis of Nash equilibria, thus overcoming a critical problem of this kind of logics regarding practical applications via automated verification. Some work also in the intersection between bisimulation equivalences, concurrent game structures, Nash equilibria, and automated formal verification is summarised next.
Logics for Strategic Reasoning. There is now a large literature on logics for strategic reasoning. From this literature, ATL * [AHK02] and SL [MMPV14] stand out, both due to their use within a number of practical tools for automated verification, and because of their expressive power. On the one hand, ATL * is known to be invariant under bisimilarity using the conventional model of strategies. As such, Nash equilibria can be expressed within ATL * only up to bisimilarity [GHW15a] . On the other hand, SL, which is strictly more expressive than ATL * , allows for a simple specification of Nash equilibria, but suffers from not being invariant under bisimilarity with respect to the conventional model of strategies. In this paper, we have put forward a number of solutions to this problem. An additional advantage of replacing the model of strategies for SL (and therefore for concurrent game structures) is that other solution concepts in game theory also become invariant under bisimilarity. For instance, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria and strong Nash equilibria-which are widely used when considering, respectively, dynamic behaviour and cooperative behaviour in multi-agent systems-can also be expressed in SL. Our results therefore imply that these concepts are also invariant under bisimilarity, when considering games over concurrent game structures and goals given by LTL formulae (which correspond to preferences over traces).
Bisimulation Equivalences for Multi-Agent Systems. Even though bisimilarity is probably the most widely used behavioural equivalence in concurrency, in the context of multi-agent systems other relations may be preferred, for instance, equivalence relations that take a detailed account of the independent interactions and behaviour of individual components in a multi-agent system. In such a setting, "alternating" relations with natural ATL * characterisations have been studied [AHKV98] . Our results also apply to such alternating equivalence relations. Alternating bisimulation is very similar to bisimilarity on labelled transition systems [Mil80, HM85] , only that when defined on concurrent game structures, instead of action profiles taken as possible transitions, one allows individual player's actions, which must be matched in the bisimulation game. Because of this, it immediately follows that any alternating bisimulation as defined in [AHKV98] is also a bisimilarity as defined here. Despite having a different formal definition, a simple observation can be made: that the counter-example shown in Figures 1 and 2 also apply to such alternating (bisimulation) relations. This immediately implies that Nash equilibria are not preserved by the alternating (bisimulation) equivalence relations in [AHKV98] either. Nevertheless, as discussed in [vB02] , the "right" notion of equivalence for games and their game theoretic solution concepts is, undoubtedly, an important and interesting topic of debate, which deserves to be investigated further. Computations vs. Traces. An important remark about the difference between computations and traces is that even though Nash equilibria and their existence are preserved under bisimilarity by three of the four strategy models we have studied, it is not the case that with each strategy model we obtain the same set of Nash equilibria in a given system, or that we can sustain the same set of computations or traces. For instance, consider again the games in Figures 1 and 2 . As we discussed above, if we consider the model of computation-based strategies and LTL goals (i.e., trace-based goals) as shown in the example, then we obtain two games, each with an associated non-empty set of Nash equilibria, which are preserved by bisimilarity. However, if we consider, instead, the model of trace-based strategies and the same LTL goals, then we obtain two concurrent games both with empty sets of Nash equilibria-thus, in this case, the non-existence of Nash equilibria is preserved by bisimilarity! To observe this, note that whereas in the case of computation-based strategies player 3 can implement a uniform "punishment" strategy for both player 1 and player 2, in the case of trace-based strategies player 3 cannot do so, even in the game in Figure 1 .
Two-Player Games with Trace-Based Goals. We also showed that if we consider twoplayer games together with the conventional model of strategies, the problems that arise with respect to the preservation of Nash equilibria disappear. This is indeed an important finding since most verification games (e.g., model and module checking, synthesis, etc.) can be phrased in terms of zero-sum two-player games together with temporal logic specifications (e.g., using LTL, CTL, or ATL * ). Our results, then, provide conclusive proof that, if only two-player games and temporal logic goals are needed, then all equilibrium analyses can be carried out using the conventional model of strategies-along with their associated reasoning tools and formal verification techniques.
Nondeterminism. We extended our main bisimulation-invariant results to nondeterministic systems, making it possible to analyse more complex systems. This was possible, in turn, because our two main models of strategies, namely computation-based and trace-based, are themselves oblivious to nondeterministic choices. As a consequence, given a particular strategy (or strategy profile, more generally), the set of outcomes of a multi-player game across bisimilar structures remains the same. Indeed, the definitions of strategies in the computation-based and trace-based models can be used to show that the set of Nash equilibria in strategy profiles given by these two models is invariant across systems that are equivalent with respect to equivalences for concurrency that are weaker than bisimilarity; for instance, across trace equivalent systems as defined in CSP [BHR84] . Thus, with respect to this kind of systems, all our positive results also carry over, even for nondeterministic processes.
Tools for Model Checking and Equilibrium Analysis. Due to the success of temporal logics and model checking in the verification of concurrent and multi-agent systems, some model checking tools have been extended to cope with the strategic analysis of concurrent systems modelled as multi-player games. For instance, tools such as MCMAS [CLMM14] , EAGLE [TGW15] , PRALINE [Bre13] , MOCHA [AHM + 98], and PRISM [KPW16] , allow for the analysis of some strategic properties in a system. Because all of these tools rely on underlying algorithms for temporal logic model checking, hardly any optimisations are possible when moving to the more complex game-theoretic setting where Nash equilibria
